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Applicant v Unifund Assurance Company, 2020 CanLII 12759 (ON LAT), <http://canlii.ca/t/j5btl
[5] In my Decision,[1] I found that CAT assessments are not considered a medical benefit and therefore their funding does not fall within the s. 18 limit of $50,000. Further, I found that the CAT assessments are reasonable and necessary.
[6] Unifund requested a reconsideration of the Decision on the grounds that the Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made. The criteria for reconsideration on this ground is set out in Rule 18.2 (b) of the Tribunal’s Common Rules.[2]
[7] The respondent requests that the Decision be varied to find that the applicant is not entitled to the CAT assessments in the amount of $15,872 because the cost exceeds the s. 18 monetary limits for medical and rehabilitation benefits available for non-CAT injuries. Further, the respondent argues that the proposed CAT assessments are neither reasonable nor necessary.
[22] The bar for granting costs is high. However, in this case the bar is met. The request for reconsideration was a frivolous request.
[23] The respondent, represented by counsel, has failed to provide any basis to support its claim. It simply repeats arguments already heard and decided in the Decision. In addition, it alleges errors of law with no supporting argument or evidence. The respondent’s submissions appear to make no effort to meet the test for a reconsideration. When considering the powers of the Tribunal to award costs under Rule 19.5, I find that this request is frivolous and interferes with the Tribunal’s efficient and effective process in adjudicating disputes.
[25] Given the frivolous nature of the request for reconsideration, I find that it is appropriate to grant an amount for costs. Therefore, I am granting the applicant costs in the amount of $100.
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M.R. v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2019 CanLII 110112 (ON LAT), <http://canlii.ca/t/j3gn5
[1] The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident on March 18, 2015. She sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule[1] (the ”Schedule”). When some of these benefits were denied by the respondent, she applied to the Tribunal.
[2] In a decision dated June 21, 2019, I found she was entitled to an income replacement benefit (limited to January 5, 2016 to June 3, 2017). I then denied her entitlement to an attendant care benefit, and I ordered that the applicant was unable to proceed with her application for three disputed treatment plans, on account of her non-attendance at two insurer’s examinations.
[3] The applicant takes issue with this decision, and so she has filed a Request for Reconsideration. Specifically, the applicant is seeking an order granting her entitlement to the denied benefits, as well as an order to allow her to proceed with her application for the disputed treatment plans. In response, the respondent is asking me to uphold my original decision.
[4] Pursuant to s. 17(2) of the Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 2009[2], I have been delegated responsibility to decide this matter in accordance with the applicable rules of the Tribunal.
[5] For the reasons that follow, the applicant’s Request for Reconsideration is dismissed. However, upon further review, I also find that my decision to grant an income replacement benefit from March 16, 2017 to June 3, 2017 was unreasonable.
[30] Though I do not conclude that I made a reversible error concerning the benefit after June 3, 2017, I do find that I erred in awarding an income replacement benefit from March 16, 2017 to June 3, 2017.
[31] In my original decision, I concluded that the applicant did not have a “complete inability” to pursue any reasonable form of employment or self-employment due to her ability to return to work with a high-end fashion store on June 4, 2017. As noted above, I stand by this reasoning.
[32] However, upon further review of my original decision, I noted that I did not make a specific finding made about the brief period from the 104-week mark to June 4, 2017. This failure to make a finding (and to instead award the benefit) amounted to a reversal of the applicant’s onus. That is, the applicant has an onus of demonstrating her entitlement to an income replacement benefit. By failing to make a finding, I effectively found that the respondent had failed to prove she should not be entitled to the benefit. This reversal is a significant error of law that must be addressed.
[33] Therefore, by upholding my earlier finding that the applicant’s ability to return to comparable, pre-accident work demonstrated that she did not suffer from a “complete inability” from June 4, 2017 onwards, I then find that the brief gap in time between the 104-week mark and this return to work is strong evidence that she never met the “complete inability” standard. As such, I find that the applicant did not demonstrate her entitlement to any income replacement benefit following the 104-week mark.
[34] The applicant’s Request for Reconsideration is dismissed. The applicant is no longer owed an income replacement benefit from March 16, 2017 to June 3, 2017, nor is she owed any interest from this period.
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Patterson v. Peladeau, 2020 ONCA 137 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/j5ckf
[1]This appeal arises from the trial judge’s dismissal of motions to strike the jury and to declare a mistrial in a motor vehicle personal injury action: Patterson v. Peladeau, 2018 ONSC 2625, 80 C.C.L.I. (5th) 213. During the jury’s deliberations, the jury asked the court a question that revealed that it may have accessed inappropriate extrinsic information, namely, a statutory provision that was irrelevant and inapplicable to this case, but which, if applied, could impact the apportionment of liability.
[2]The trial judge questioned the jury foreperson, who revealed that he had found the provision on an Ontario government website on the weekend at the beginning of the deliberations, and then shared it with the other jurors. The foreperson also revealed that this was the full extent of the extrinsic information and that no other juror had accessed the internet in relation to the case.
[3]Based on these answers, the trial judge was satisfied that he did not need to question the other jurors and that this issue, while serious, could be dealt with through a correcting charge. He dismissed the appellants’ pre-verdict motion to strike the jury, as well as their post-verdict motion to declare a mistrial.
[4]The appellants now appeal to this court. They contend that the trial judge failed to conduct a proper inquiry as to what extrinsic information the jury had obtained and then failed to analyze its prejudicial effect. The appellants assert that the trial judge should have polled every juror or permitted counsel to question them.
[5]For the reasons that follow, we do not agree with the appellants’ submissions and dismiss the appeal.
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Dimech v. Osman, 2020 ONSC 1084 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/j59mx
[3] For the reasons that follow, I find that the defendants have not met their evidentiary burden to establish that there is no serious issue requiring a trial on the limitation period issue. Therefore, the motion must be dismissed. The limitation period will remain an issue for trial.
[20] The plaintiff concedes that he knew or ought to have known that his injuries were “serious” during the 37-day pre-limitation period window But, he submits, there was no indication in the medical records from that period that his injuries would be “permanent” or that they would impair an “important…function” permanently. The plaintiff argues that in the 37 days after his accident, he had not even begun rehabilitation. His injuries were still acute. He was being treated. His psychiatrist had deferred providing an assessment. He was seeing his surgeon and family doctor for ongoing treatment. He followed their advice regarding treatment and follow-up. It was too early to know if his pain would become chronic or his injuries permanent.
[37] As the defendants have not established that there is no serious issue requiring a trial, the motion must be and is hereby dismissed.