Author Archives: Admin4

Car crushed by tree in Montreal is perfect insurance ad

On Monday morning a tree crushed a car roof after rot caused it to collapse. The car was pretty much totalled. Luckily in a situation like this, a car insurance policy will pay for the repair or replacement of the car, but just in case the owner didn’t know that, some helpful person left a flyer for an insurance company under the windshield wiper of the car.

http://www.lowestrates.ca/news/crushed-car-montreal-perfect-insurance-ad-24212

Customer pays $600 more for car insurance after moving 4km

The interesting and somewhat hilarious story of one Toronto resident highlights how auto insurance companies calculate premiums based on location. Sometimes the system is so rigid that it can result in savings or paying a lot more for coverage, through the space of a few blocks.

https://www.shopinsurancecanada.ca/blog/news/customer-pays-600-more-for-car-insurance-after-moving-4km/

ICBC asks for 4.9% increase to basic insurance rates, lower than last year’s 5.5% increase

Among the contributing factors was a rapid increase in the number of reported crashes. The number of crashes across B.C. jumped by 15% in two years, from 260,000 in 2013 to 300,000 in 2015. As well, the number of injury claims per 100 crashes has jumped by 32% over the last six years.

http://www.canadianunderwriter.ca/insurance/icbc-asks-4-9-increase-basic-insurance-rates-lower-last-years-5-5-increase-1004099134/

Changes to Definition of Catastrophic for car accidents in Ontario Post June 1, 2016

CAT claims are in the category of the most serious cases we see at our law firm. Not just any run of the mill car accident case will qualify as catastrophic. There is an ever changing medico-legal definition of that it takes for injuries from a car accident to be categorised as catastrophic. The medico-legal definition changed very recently (June 1, 2016 to be exact).

http://www.torontoinjurylawyerblog.com/2016/08/changes-definition-catastrophic-car-accidents-ontario-post-june-1-2016.html

Implied Consent in a Car Accident Injury Claim

When is it permissible to borrow another individual’s vehicle when they have not expressly given you permission to do so? And what are the legal repercussions if you are involved in an accident while in possession of that individual’s car? These were the issues the Court had to consider in resolving a 2016 civil suit, in Watts v. Bowman

http://www.personalinjurylawyerservice.ca/blog/implied-consent-in-a-car-accident-injury-claim

Double Count Me Out: Confusion Persists when Rating Brain Injuries and Mental and Behavioural Disorders

Concerns about “double counting” in the context of catastrophic impairment determination under the various versions of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (“Schedule”) are nothing new. Although the question has been addressed in numerous cases over the years, confusion persists.

http://www.millerthomson.com/en/blog/ontario-insurance-litigation-blog/double-count-me-out-confusion-persists-when

Let us keep more money, disability advocates tell province

Walrond will join social justice group ACORN Ottawa at a rally outside MPP Bob Chiarelli’s office Friday, where they’ll call for the right to keep more of their income while receiving payments from the Ontario Disability Support Program. They’re hoping to get 5,000 signatures on a petition, too.

http://www.metronews.ca/news/ottawa/2016/08/25/let-us-keep-more-money-disability-advocates-tell-province.html

Psychiatrist diagnosed local optician without meeting him

A Burlington optician is outraged after discovering a psychiatrist he’d never met wrote a critical two-page psychiatric evaluation about him without ever seeing or talking to him.

The optician, Jay Hakim, filed a complaint with the provincial medical regulator, which concluded the psychiatrist’s conduct was appropriate.

https://ca.news.yahoo.com/psychiatrist-diagnosed-local-optician-without-213023147.html

100001811438 (Re), 2014 CanLII 91057 (CA VRAB)

http://canlii.ca/t/gjx5d

To be found credible, a medical opinion must demonstrate – at the very least – that it is taking into consideration the specifics of an Appellant’s medical history. It is not sufficient for a doctor to merely claim that they have “taken into account” the history and then move directly to a conclusion. An understandable analysis is a vital part of a credible medical opinion.

Our duty to evaluate the quality of medical opinions is recognized by the Federal Court. This is part of the analytical process, as affirmed in the case of King2, when the Federal Court wrote that the Board cannot be expected to simply “rubber stamp” any medical opinion put before it.

 

In this case the doctor – in neither of his two opinions – explained how he could reach his conclusion absent any record of shoulder injury at the time of the 2003 accident, absent any recorded shoulder complaints, and absent any other injury during the Appellant’s military service.

 

If anything, the doctor appears to be standing for the proposition that the shoulder disabilities have developed from the other parts of the body that were recorded as having been injured in 2003. Such would be a consequential relationship, which is not presently before the Board. We are limited to the direct service connection under Section 45 of the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act.

Sawah v Warren, 2016 ONSC 5370 (CanLII)

http://canlii.ca/t/gt40l

[6]                     For the purposes of this Motion, it is necessary only to note that the action brought by the Plaintiff arises out of the settlement of a tort action for personal injuries allegedly caused as a result of a motor vehicle accident, and a parallel claim for Statutory Accident Benefits.  Both the Defendant Warren, who is a solicitor, and the Defendant Jhuti, who is a licenced paralegal, were involved, although their involvement was different.  Jhuti, not being a solicitor, could not act for the Plaintiff in the tort action, although she could act for him on the Statutory Accident Benefits claim.

[7]                     In substance, it is alleged by the Plaintiff that the Statutory Accident Benefits claim was settled for $15,000, while he was told it was settled for $6,000.  He alleges that the tort claim was settled for $22,500, while he was told it was settled for $18,000.  The Plaintiff alleges that this was part of a scheme by one or both of the Defendants to pocket the difference in the amounts of the actual settlements and the amounts represented to him.

[19]                 To me, it is inconceivable that either Mr. Warren or Mr. Pickard could have believed that the payment to Ms. Jhuti was not relevant, having regard to the allegations made in the case.  Fundamentally, it is alleged by Mr. Sawah that he was defrauded by Mr. Warren, Ms. Jhuti or both of them, as a result of a misrepresentation of the amount of the settlement.  The fact that Ms. Jhuti was paid a substantial amount of money out of the settlement proceeds would be highly relevant.  Mr. Warren says he was counsel for Mr. Sawah, and the contingency fee was his.  The fact that a large sum was paid to Ms. Jhuti is certainly suspicious. Of course, it would be open to them to provide whatever explanation they chose for the payment.  However, it cannot be realistically be asserted that the documents, and particularly the cheque to Ms. Jhuti, are not relevant.

[20]                 The explanation is particularly suspicious, in my view, in view of the way in which the documents were ultimately disclosed.  At the very least, the candour of Mr. Warren and Mr. Pickard is subject to serious question.

[21]                 The issue, then, is whether an order pursuant to Rule 59.06 (2) should be made.  Under that Rule, the Court has a discretion to set aside or vary an order on the ground or fraud or of facts arising or discovered after the order was made.

[22]                 In this case, there is no doubt that there are facts that were discovered by the Plaintiff after my order was made.  The relevant documents that would have disclosed a payment of over $9,000 to Ms. Jhuti were not disclosed until April, 2016.  Counsel for the Plaintiff acknowledged, during argument, that it would have to be shown that the non-disclosure was deliberate in order to justify an order under Rule 59.06 (2).

[23]                 I do not accept Mr. Warren’s argument that the Plaintiff should have been able to figure out that a payment was made from what was disclosed in the report of Mr. Warren’s expert.  It was certainly not clear from the expert’s report that a payment of over $9,000 was made to Ms. Jhuti, and that it was labelled “Sawah Costs”.